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We analyze a market game where rms choose capacities under uncertainty about
future market conditions and make output choices after uncertainty has unraveled.
We show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under imperfect competition and
establish that capacity choices by strategic rms are generally too low from a welfare
point of view. We also demonstrate that strategic rms choose even lower capacities if
they anticipate competitive spot market pricing (e.g. due to regulatory intervention).
We 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11 Introduction
In this article we investigate the nature of equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic mar-
kets where rms make capacity choices under uncertainty about future market conditions
(and/or anticipating uctuating demand) and decide on output after the state of nature
has unraveled. The fact that in many industries where non storable goods are produced,
capacity is a long run decision, whereas production may be adjusted short{run is a natural
motivation for our approach. Consider, for example, the electricity sector or the High Tech
industry, where production has to take place just in time, but capacities have to be installed
well in advance. In those markets rms usually face considerable demand and cost uncer-
tainty when choosing their capacities. This may be due to uncertainty about the economic
trend, about the success of a new product, about future weather conditions, or fuel prices,
to give just a few examples. In electricity markets it is moreover well known that demand
uctuates systematically over each day, month, or year. Firms naturally anticipate those
patterns when they make their investment decisions.
For a competitive industry investment incentives prior to spot market competition have
been analyzed by the peak load pricing literature (see e.g. Crew and Kleindorfer (1986)
for an overview).1 It is shown that under perfect competition spot prices and quantities
are determined by the intersection of (short run) marginal cost and demand, and that
investment incentives are such that the social optimum is attained. It is important to
note that in this "competitive benchmark" spot market prices may rise considerably above
marginal cost of the last unit produced in case the capacity bound is reached. The reason
is that the marginal cost curve is vertical at the capacity bound, and therefore prices are
driven by the demand side in case the capacity constraint is binding.
Little is known, however, about the investment incentives of strategic rms under un-
certain or uctuating demand. Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) were the rst to analyze
capacity choice by strategic rms prior to Cournot competition. They demonstrate in a
linear duopoly model existence of a symmetric equilibrium. Reynolds and Wilson (2000)
show that a two stage game where rms rst invest under demand uncertainty and then
engage in Bertrand competition after uncertainty unraveled has no symmetric pure strat-
egy equilibrium.2 Fabra and de Frutos (2006) take up on this and characterize asymmetric
1There is also an extensive literature that analyzes the impact of demand uncertainty on expected prots
for monopolistic and competitive industries. See, for example, Oi (1961), Samdmo (1971), Leland (1972),
or Dr eze and Gabszewicz (1967).
2Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Osborne and Pitchik (1986) have shown that for certain demand
2equilibria of this game. Garcia and Stacchetti (2007) analyze Markovian equilibria of a
strategic dynamic model with random demand growth and nd that rms have incentives
to hold low reserve margins in order to extract higher rents.
In our paper we take up on the analysis of capacity choices under uncertainty prior
to Cournot competition. This framework allows to answer the question: How does mar-
ket power in the short run (at the production stage) aect investment incentives in the
long run? This question obviously cannot be answered in a model where rms engage in
Bertrand competition at stage two, since in that model unconstrained rms do not exercise
market power. We believe that such a model would not describe the markets we are in-
terested in.3 Our analysis provides existence and uniqueness results in a general oligopoly
model with endogenous investment that allows for either cost or demand uncertainty. This
allows to answer some of the key questions concerning the investment incentives of strategic
rms: First, we show that total capacity installed by strategic rms is too low both, locally
(that is, given that rms behave strategically at the production stage) as well as globally
(as compared to the rst best competitive benchmark as analyzed by the peak load pricing
literature). Obviously, strategic withholding is practiced not only at the production stage
but also at the investment stage. Second, we analyze investment incentives in case strategic
rms anticipate a competitive spot market outcome (for example since they expect regula-
tory intervention at the spot market). We show that in this case investment is lower than
in the case where rms anticipate the Cournot outcome at stage two. Furthermore, unique-
ness of equilibrium cannot be established. The result demonstrates that intervention only
at the spot market may have undesirable eects if investment is endogenous. The welfare
eect of spot market regulation is ambiguous in our model with endogenous capacity choice
and may go in either direction.
We nally demonstrate how our theoretical insights can be used to assess long run
eects of electricity market liberalization on capacity levels and to quantify the capacity and
welfare eects of several recent policy proposals. We conduct our empirical analysis based
on data of the German electricity market. We use estimates of short run demand elasticity,
as well as data on variable production cost and investment cost in order to compute total
the Cournot outcome obtains if rms choose capacities prior to price competition.
3Having in mind applications like electricity markets, one could also opt for auctions or supply function
competition to model competition in the short run. However, those models typically have multiple equilibria
which limits the tractability of a model with endogenous investment decisions. Moreover, the Cournot
outcome seems to be a good approximation of coalition{proof supply function equilibria, as Delgado and
Moreno (2004) show.
3capacity predicted by our model for the scenarios we analyze, for dierent degrees of market
concentration. Comparison with currently installed capacity yields that actual capacity is
rather close to the First Best level. This is presumably due to the regulatory regime in the
pre{liberalization period which imposed too high investment incentives. In accordance with
this observation we nd that observed prices during the hours where capacity is binding
(approximately 12 % of the year) are rather close to the rst best level. Our theoretical
model, however, implies that those prices are not sucient to sustain the actual capacity
level if investment is chosen strategically. In the long run, we detect a high potential
for the exercise of market power through capacity withholding, which would signicantly
raise average prices well above the current level. We nally quantify the welfare eect
of tight market monitoring at the production stage, and its direction. It turns out to
be negative in concentrated industries, while it is slightly positive for more competitive
markets.4 Our empirical study demonstrates that our model adds important aspects to the
ongoing debate on market power in electricity markets, which often ignores the possibility
of strategic investment and focuses solely at assessment of the short run behavior of rms.5
Our paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we state the model. Section 3 contains the
theoretical analysis and results. We consider strategic investment in section 3.1 and welfare
optimal investment in section 3.2. In section 3.3 we provide a comparison of investment
levels in the scenarios we consider and explore in more detail under what conditions the
presence of uncertainty crucially aects the conclusions. Section 4 contains the empirical
analysis, where we also discuss the welfare implications of spot market regulation. Section
5 concludes.
2 The Model
We analyze a two stage market game where rms have to choose capacities under demand
and cost uncertainty, and make output choices after market conditions unraveled. We
denote by q = (q1;:::;qn) the vector of outputs of the n rms, and by Q =
Pn
i=1 qi total
quantity produced in the market.
Inverse Demand is given by the function P(Q;), which depends on Q 2 R+, and the
random variable  2 R which represents uncertainty. Moreover, all rms face the same
4This is also conrmed by a simplied theoretical analysis with linear demand and uniform distribution
of uncertainty.
5See, e.g. Schwarz and Lang (2006) for Germany, Joskow and Kahn (2002) for California, or Wolfram
(1999) for the United Kingdom.
4cost function for each  2 R, which we denote by C(qi;). The random variable  2 R is
distributed according to a distribution F() with bounded support.6
We introduce the parameter z  0 as a lower bound on market prices in order to
take into account nonnegativity of prices (z = 0) or disposal cost (z < 0). We denote
the quantity where this lower bound is met by Q().7 The following two assumptions on
demand and cost for each realization of uncertainty  2 R have to be satised only for
quantities 0  qi  Q < Q().
Assumption 1 (Assumptions at each ) (i) Inverse demand P(Q;) is twice con-
tinuously dierentiable8 in Q with Pq(Q;) < 0 and Pq(Q;) + Pqq(Q;)qi < 0.
(ii) C(qi;) is twice continuously dierentiable in qi with Cq(qi;)  0 and Cqq(qi;)  0.
Assumption 2 (Monotonicity Assumptions regarding ) (i) P(Q;) and
C(qi;) are dierentiable in , and it holds that P(Q;)   Cq(qi;) > 0.9
(ii) P(Q;)qi C(qi;) is (dierentiable) strict supermodular in qi and , i. e. P(Q;) 
Cq(qi) + Pq(Q;)qi > 0.
The situation we want to analyze is captured by the following two stage game. At
stage one rms simultaneously build up capacities x = (x1;:::;xn). Capacity choices are
observed by all rms. Cost of investment K(xi) is the same for all rms and satises
6While F has bounded support, it will be convenient to assume that P(Q;) is dened for all  2 R and
Q 2 R+.
7In case the lower bound is not binding we can set Q() = 1. In order to ensure a bounded solution
we then have to assume limQ!1 P(Q;) < Cq(0;) for each  2 ( 1;1].
8Throughout the paper we denote the derivative of a function g(x;y) with respect to the argument x,
by gx(x;y), the second derivative with respect to that argument by gxx(x;y), and the cross derivative by
gxy(x;y).
9Notice that demand and cost uncertainty in principle can be driven by separate random events. Then
the parameter  denotes then all joint realizations of those events, which have to satisfy assumption 2.
This requirement imposes some further restrictions on the model if cost and demand uncertainty should
be considered simultaneously. Consider, for example, a model with linear demand P(Q;) =    bQ and
uctuating but constant marginal cost c(). For ease of exposition let both,  and  follow a discrete
distribution. Now sort all joint realizations (;) such that  c() is increasing and index each realization
by . Observe that the resulting system satises assumption 2 (i) and 2 (ii). Thus, the model can deal
simultaneously with cost and demand uncertainty in the case of linear demand, which we exploit in the
empirical part of the paper. In case of non{linear demand it is more plausible to think about demand and
cost uncertainty separately.
5Assumption 3 (Investment Cost) Investment cost K(xi) is twice continuously dier-
entiable, with Kx(xi)  0 and Kxx(xi)  0.
At stage two, facing the capacity constraints inherited from stage one, rms simultane-
ously choose outputs at the spot market. Since demand uncertainty unravels prior to the
output decision, produced quantities depend on the realized demand scenario. We denote
individual quantities produced in demand scenario  by q() = (q1();:::;qn()), and the
aggregate quantity by Q() =
Pn
i=1 qi().
Finally, we state rm i's stage one expected prot from operating if capacities are given




[P (Q();)qi ()   C (qi ();)]dF ()   K (xi): (1)
Throughout the paper we consider only cases where investment is gainful, i.e. K(0) <
E[P(0;)   C(0;)]. Note that if the condition does not hold, no rm invests in capacity.
3 Results
In this section we analyze the two stage market game where at stage one rms simulta-
neously invest in capacity under uncertainty about future market conditions and at stage
two, when uncertainty has unraveled, decide on production. In order to be able to assess
the impact of market power and of regulatory interventions on investment incentives and
production, we analyze four dierent scenarios.
In section 3.1 we consider the case that strategic rms choose prot maximizing in-
vestment levels. In this context we consider both, the case of Cournot competition at the
spot market as well as the case of competitive pricing (which may be a result of regulatory
intervention). We are aware that the latter scenario requires a lot of information on the
part of the social planer. Although stylized, however, it allows detailed insights in what
happens to investment incentives should the regulator suceed in implementing competitive
prices at the spot market.
In section 3.2 we assume that socially optimal investment levels are chosen at stage
one (e.g. enforced by a social planer) and again consider Cournot competition as well as
the case of competitive pricing at the spot market. The latter scenario coincides with the
competitive benchmark that has been analyzed by the peak load pricing literature. Table
2 relates the four scenarios we consider.
10That is, 0  qi()  xi for all  2 [ 1;1], i = 1;:::;n.
6Objective at the Production Stage
Prot Welfare
(strategic rms)
Objective Prot Cournot Marginal Cost Pricing
at the (str. rms) (total investment XC) (total investment XMC)
Investment Welfare Second Best First Best
Stage (total investment XSB) (total investment XFB)
Table 1: The four scenarios analyzed.
3.1 Strategic Investment
First consider the market game where rms strategically choose capacities at stage one as
to maximize prots. Our rst theorem shows that the two stage market game where rms
engage in Cournot competition (C) at stage two has a unique and symmetric equilibrium.
If, however, a social planer intervenes at the production stage (implementing marginal cost
(MC) pricing whenever rms are unconstrained), uniqueness can no longer be established
and also existence cannot be guaranteed for general production costs.
Theorem 1 (Strategic Capacity Choice) Suppose strategic rms choose their ca-
pacities at stage one.
(C) If rms engage in Cournot competition at the second stage, the game has a unique
equilibrium which is symmetric.
(MC) Suppose that rms anticipate marginal cost pricing at stage two, and that Cq(q;) is
constant in q. Then, there exists at least one symmetric equilibrium, but there may
be more than one. No asymmetric equilibria exist.



























where ~ S  
XS
is the demand scenario from which on rms are capacity constrained at stage
two.11




n ; ~ C) and MC is implicitly dened
by P(XMC; ~ MC) = Cq(X
MC
n ; ~ MC), respectively.
7Proof See appendix B 
Let us emphasize some important aspects of our results. First, we could show that under
standard regularity assumptions the Cournot market game (i.e. the game where rms act
strategically at both stages) has a unique equilibrium. Second, we nd that (symmetric)
equilibrium investment can be characterized by a rather intuitive condition. The condition
simply says that expected marginal prot generated by an additional unit of capacity at
the second stage must equal marginal cost of investment. When calculating the marginal
prot generated by an additional unit of capacity, however, one has to take into account
that additional capacity aects a rm's prot only in those states of nature where capacity
is binding. Thus, expectation must only be taken with respect to those scenarios in which
the rms are capacity constrained, i. e. over the interval [~ 
 
XS
;1], and not over the
whole domain of .
Note that the critical demand scenario ~  (from which on rms are capacity constrained)
depends on the market game at stage two. If rms strategically withhold production at the
spot market (as under Cournot competition) the critical demand scenario is higher than
in the case where they are forced to the competitive production schedule. Observe that
actually the market game at stage two enters into the rst order condition solely through
the critical demand realization.
If rms anticipate that at stage two the welfare optimum given their capacity choices
is implemented, existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium cannot be shown
in the general case (part (MC) of the theorem). Only for constant marginal production
cost we obtain existence (but not uniqueness).12 An immediate insight of this result is
that intervention at stage two may lead to high strategic uncertainty for the rms. Later
in section 3.3 we will show that intervention at stage two moreover decreases investment
incentives.
3.2 Optimal Investment
In order to assess the impact of market power at stage one on investment incentives, we now
characterize welfare optimal capacity levels. Again, we consider both, the case of Cournot
12The basic problem is that in neither case the stage one prot is quasiconcave, which makes stan-
dard analysis impossible. In the case of linear marginal cost, however, we can exploit recent insights on
oligopolistic competition that makes use of lattice theory (Amir (1996) and Amir and Lambson (2000)).
In the general case (i. e. strictly convex production cost), however, the game cannot be reformulated as a
supermodular game and thus, even more sophisticated techniques do not help.
8competition at stage two (Second Best solution | SB), as well as the case of welfare optimal
production (First Best solution | FB).
Theorem 2 (Welfare Maximization at Stage One) Suppose capacities are chosen
at stage one as to maximize social welfare.
(SB) If rms engage in Cournot competition at the second stage, welfare maximizing ca-
pacities are unique and symmetric.
(FB) If either production or investment costs are strictly convex, the First Best solution
(that maximizes total welfare) is unique and symmetric.
























where ~ W  
xW
is the demand scenario from which on rms are capacity constrained at
stage two.13
Proof See appendix C 
Note that also the characterization of welfare optimal investment levels is rather intu-
itive. The condition implies that in the welfare optimum capacity should be chosen such
that expected marginal social welfare generated by an additional unit of capacity [LHS of
(2)] should equal marginal cost of investment [RHS of (2)]. Again it is important to notice
that expectation is only taken over those scenarios where the rms are actually constrained
given the scheduled stage two{production, that is, over the interval [~ S(XS);1]. Note that
for a given investment, rms are constrained earlier if socially optimal production is im-
plemented at stage two since under Cournot competition they withhold quantity in order
to aect prices. Consequently, additional capacity is used more often (or, with a higher
probability) and thus, contributes more to expected marginal welfare if the spot market
behavior is more competitive. This implies that the First Best capacity level should be
higher than the Second Best. We show this formally in section 3.3.
We nally point out that if rms do not act strategically, investment and production
levels coincide with the rst best (socially optimal) solution, again given the number of
rms:




n ; ~ SB) and FB is implic-
itly dened by P(XFB; ~ FB) = Cq(X
FB
n ; ~ FB), respectively.
9Remark 1 (Non-Strategic Firms) For each number of rms, n, if rms do not behave
strategically (i. e. they act as price takers at stage two and ignore their impact on total
capacity at stage one), rms invest and produce optimally from a social welfare point of
view.
3.3 Comparison of Investment Levels
In this section we compare equilibrium investments in the scenarios we analyzed in the
previous two sections and discuss the impact of uncertainty on the ranking we nd.
Theorem 3 (i) For any nite number of rms, n, it holds that
{ Strategic rms invest less if they anticipate a more competitive result at the spot
market, i. e. XC
n  XMC
n .




{ The rst best solution yields the highest investment among all scenarios.











Proof See appendix D 
Let us briey provide some intuition for our result, using some characteristics of the
rst order conditions as stated in theorems 1 and 2. Let us rst draw the reader's attention
to the particular structure of the rst order conditions in theorems 1 and 2. They all
equalize expected marginal prot or welfare [LHS] with marginal cost of capacity [RHS].
Note that, at the LHS, the stage one{objective (either prot or welfare) is reected only in
the integrand. That is, we integrate over marginal prot in cases where the rms maximize
prots at stage one (C and MC) and over marginal welfare in cases where welfare is the
stage one-objective (FB and SB). The stage two{objective enters exclusively into the lower
limit of integration, which is the demand scenario from which on rms are constrained given
the capacities chosen at stage one.
Now consider the optimal capacity choice of strategic rms. If the rms anticipate
Cournot competition at stage two, marginal prot generated by additional capacity is
positive in each scenario where the rm is constrained. If rms expect competitive behavior
10at the spot market, however, this is not the case. A rm might be forced to use additional
capacity although the marginal prot from using it may be negative.14 Consequently,
additional capacity is less valuable to the rms in the latter case and investments are lower.
Comparison of the rst order conditions in cases C (theorem 1) and SB (theorem 2)
reveals why strategic rms always invest too little. Note that for any xed capacity level,
additional capacity is more valuable in case SB than in case C, since expected marginal
welfare is always higher than expected marginal prot.15 Consequently, from a social welfare
perspective, strategic investments are too low.
Also the comparison of the First Best and the Second Best case is intuitive. As already
mentioned, rms are constrained earlier the more competitive the spot market behavior is.
Thus, in the First Best case, for any initial capacity level additional capacity is used more
often and therefore generates a higher increase in social welfare.
Finally we derive exact conditions under which the weak inequalities from theorem 3 are
strict, and hold with equality, respectively. They hold with equality whenever already the
capacity choice determines production in any demand scenario  where f() > 0, that is, if
rms are always constrained at the production stage. Our theorem illustrates under what
conditions on the nature of uncertainty the regime at stage two matters for the capacity
choice (and when it is irrelevant).
Theorem 4 (Degenerate Cases) Denote by  () the lowest (highest) demand scenario
where f() > 0 and suppose that f() > 0 for all  2 [;]. Denote by QC() the aggregate
Cournot quantity in scenario  in the absence of capacity constraints. It holds that16
(i) XC  QC() , XC = XMC,
(ii) XFB  QC() , XFB = XSB.
Proof See appendix E 
The following table visualizes the result of theorem 4.
If condition (i) of theorem 4 holds, in the Cournot market game (see theorem 1) rms
want to be constrained at the production stage in any state of nature  2 [;]. Since the
incentive to be constrained is higher in case of optimal regulation at stage two, the solutions
14This is the case in all demand scenarios in [~ MC; ~ C].
15Formally, at a xed capacity level, the critical value ~  is the same in both cases, but the integrand is
pointwisely bigger in case SB than in case C.
16The assumption f() > 0 is only needed for the "("-direction. ")" always holds.
11Genuine Uncertainty Degenerate Cases
QC() < XC XC  QC() < XFB XFB  QC()
XMC < XC XMC = XC
XSB < XFB XSB = XFB
Table 2: Degenerate Cases and Equivalence of Scenarios.
of C and MC collapse in this case. Moreover, comparison with a result by Reynolds and
Wilson (2000) shows that under condition (i) also a game where rms invest prior to
Bertrand competition at stage two yields the same capacity as C and MC.17 Obviously,
condition (i) describes a degenerate environment where uncertainty does not matter much.
Under genuine uncertainty, where rms are unconstrained in at least some states of nature,
our analysis demonstrates that in fact market organization at stage two matters a lot.18
If condition (ii) holds, at the welfare maximizing (First Best) capacity level even strategic
rms are constrained in any demand scenario  2 [;] at stage two. Notice that condition
(ii) is stronger than condition (i) [since XFB > XC, as we have shown in theorem 3].
Consequently, (ii) can only hold in a degenerate environment where uncertainty is not an
important issue.
The reason why the level of uncertainty is not the only decisive factor for a equivalence
of XFB and XSB can best be illustrated in case of certain demand. At the production stage,
strategic rms play either their Cournot quantity given marginal production cost, or their
capacity, whichever is lower. This implies that even under certainty the First Best and the
Second Best outcome coincide only in those cases where the First Best capacity level is below
the Cournot quantities at stage two. Thus, condition (ii) requires that marginal capacity
cost is suciently high compared to marginal production cost and that uncertainty does
not matter much. As we have shown in our analysis, however, under genuine uncertainty
17Reynolds and Wilson show that under condition (i) capacity choice prior to Bertrand competition
yields the same outcome as capacity choice in a game where rms cannot adjust their production after
uncertainty unraveled. It is easy to show that under condition (i) the latter game yields the same outcome
as our Cournot market game (which clearly is not the case if condition (i) does not hold).
18For the Bertrand market game Reynolds and Wilson (2000) show that under genuine uncertainty
equilibria with equal capacities of the rms do not exist.
12the First Best solution always implies higher investment than the second best solution,
independent of marginal capacity and production cost.
Whereas capacities in the four scenarios we analyze can be ranked unambiguously, this
is not always true when it comes to social welfare. A welfare comparison is simple and
straightforward for cases C, SB, and FB (where welfare is increasing in this order). It
is not obvious, however, whether welfare is higher in case C or MC. In scenario C rms
exercise market power at the spot market, whereas in case MC spot prices are regulated to
the competitive level. Thus, in absence of capacity constraints welfare would be higher in
MC. However, at stage one strategic rms choose lower capacities in case MC such that
prices are higher in case MC than in C whenever rms are capacity constrained in both
cases. Consequently, a welfare comparison between the two cases is not straightforward
and necessarily depends on details of the model's specication. A simplied model with
linear demand demonstrates that both, an increase and a decrease in welfare is possible and
suggests that regulation of the production stage is particularly undesirable from a welfare
point of view if the number of rms is low. We come back to this issue in section 4, where
we t our model to the data of the German electricity market.
4 An Empirical Analysis of Capacity Choice in Elec-
tricity Markets | The Example of Germany
In this section we demonstrate how our theoretical insights can be used to assess (long
run) capacity and welfare eects of electricity market liberalization. We also quantify
the capacity and welfare eects of several recent policy proposals for dierent degrees of
market concentration.19 The approach can be applied to any electricity market by tting
the theoretical model to the corresponding data and comparing predicted strategic capacity
choices to the actually installed level.20 Here, for the reason of data availability, we use
data of the German electricity market.
19All welfare eects we demonstrate can also be shown in a simplied model with linear demand and
uniform distribution of uncertainty. In particular, in Grimm and Zoettl (2007) we show that the more
concentrated the market is, the less competitive the stage{two market outcome should be from a welfare
point of view.
20We are not aware of any empirical studies of investment in electricity markets. The main reason
presumably is that the post liberalization period is not yet long enough to generate data on investment
cycles. This is also a strong argument for tting a theoretical model to the primitives of a market to get
an impression of possible long run eects that cannot appear in the data yet.
13Note that | although they are quite stylized | our scenarios capture nicely some recent
policy proposals. A spot market intervention as described in case MC is closely related to
the common proposal to monitor tightly the rms' spot market behavior.21 The dierence
of capacity levels in scenarios C and SB is a proxy for the desirability of capacity markets
or other mechanisms that increase investment incentives. Thus, our analysis yields insights
to assess some policy tools that have been at the focus of the current debate on the need of
reorganization of the German electricity market. Apart from capacity choices, we also focus
on the price distribution in the dierent scenarios and on welfare implications of regulatory
interventions.
Our aim is to t the theoretical model as closely as possible to the data of the German
Electricity market for the year 2006 and to compute resulting investment in gas turbine
generation capacity for the scenarios MC, C, SB, and FB. Note that this approach yields
total investment under the assumption that each rm's marginal generating unit is always
a gas turbine. Since investment in the last unit of capacity (which, of course, determines
total capacity) is always a marginal decision, we do not need to specify the inframarginal
technology mix for the empirical analysis. Note however, that we need to assume that rms
are symmetric in size (but not necessarily with respect to their inframarginal technology
mix). Since mark-ups in the Cournot model generally increase if rms become asymmetric,
our results yield a lower bound for the extent of market power for a given number of rms.
In order to use our theoretical model for the analysis we chose to make the following
specications. We assume linear uctuating demand P(Q) =    bQ and uctuating but
constant marginal cost c(). Note that for linear demand our model can allow simulta-
neously for both, demand and cost uncertainty. If we sort all realizations of demand and
cost according to the dierences    c(), the resulting framework satises assumptions 1
to 3. Furthermore, for the sake of our applied example, we interpret the distribution over
the demand scenarios as relative frequencies which have been accurately predicted by all
rms.22
For a given demand and cost distribution and for given marginal investment cost, pre-
21See, e.g. Monopolkommission (2007), p.4, paragraph 9.*. If the regulator has perfect information, the
result of such an intervention would be marginal cost pricing at stage two.
22That is, in our empirical analysis we have no uncertainty but just demand uctuation over time.
In practice, there should be two competing eects if uncertainty would be added to the analysis. Since
investment in gas turbines is rather risky and rms are typically risk averse, the benchmark determined
should yield too much investment. On the other hand, however, our model implies that a risk neutral rm
should invest more if risk is increased.
14dicted capacities can be calculated by solving the corresponding rst order conditions as
stated in theorems 1 and 2. The resulting capacity choices allow us to derive the price
distribution for those hours where capacity is binding, and to compare it to the observed
price distribution. Moreover, we can capture the welfare eect of regulatory interventions.
To this aim we calculate the welfare dierence to the Cournot case for scenarios MC, SB,
and FB and add up welfare dierences generated in each hour of the year.
In order to assess the robustness of our results we do not perform the analysis for single
parameter values, but rather for plausible ranges of parameter distributions. This concerns
the following parameters of the model: The demand elasticity (determined by the slope of
the demand function, b), marginal cost of production, c, and marginal investment cost, k.
From the possible ranges of those parameters, our algorithm selects one random combination
in each iteration. The resulting distributions of capacities and welfare dierences give an
impression of the sensitivity of our results to changes in the parameters. In the following
we provide some details on the relevant ranges of our cost and demand parameters.
Market demand: To construct uctuating market demand, we depart from hourly mar-
ket prices (from the European Energy Exchange (EEX)23) and hourly quantities consumed
(from the Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE)24) for the year
2006. We chose the value of b in line with other studies on energy markets. Most studies
that estimate demand for electricity25 nd short run elasticities between 0.1 and 0.5 and
long run elasticities between 0.3 and 0.7.26 The relevant range of prices is around P = 100
€/MWh and corresponding consumption is approximately Q = 50 GW. In our simulations
we thus use a uniform distribution of b on the interval [0:004;0:007], which corresponds to
elasticities between 0:5 and 0:29.
Production cost: The major components of variable production cost are gas prices27
and prices for CO2 emission allowances.28 The average TTF gas price in 2006 was 20
23See www.EEX.com
24See www.UCTE.org
25See, for example, Lijsen (2006) for an overview of recent contributions on that issue.
26E.g. Beenstock et al. (1999), Bjorner and Jensen (2002), Filippini Pachuari (2002), Booinekamp (2007),
and many others.
27Daily values from the Dutch Hub TTF, corrected for transportation cost.
28Daily data taken from the EEX. The emission-coecient for natural gas is set by the German ministry
of environment at 56t CO2/TJ which corresponds to 0.2016t CO2=MWh. Compare Umweltbundesamt
(2004).
15€/MWh and CO2 permissions traded on average for 9.30 €/MWh.29 The eciency of gas
turbines currently ranges at around 37;5%.30 The resulting daily production cost for the
year 2006 was on average 66.30 €/MWh. Daily values, as used in our empirical analysis,
are illustrated in gure 1. In our simulations we use the observed distribution but multiply











































































Figure 1: Production Cost in the Year 2006.
Investment Cost: Since we analyze investment incentives based solely on one year, we
break down investment cost to annuities.31 In order to take construction time of gas turbine
plants into account we consider investment cost on the basis of data from the year 2000.
We assume perfect foresight, i.e. all cost components have been predicted accurately by the
rms at the time of their investment decision. We base investment cost on the following
29Recall that we do not use the averages but the daily values in our simulation.
30See 2006 GTW Handbook or EWI and Prognos (2005).
31The results will thus only yield a benchmark for current protability of investment. Provided, however,
that yearly demand is increasing over time (and that strategic timing of investment is not an issue) our
procedure should yield accurate predictions, even though once installed capacities cannot be removed the
subsequent year.
16two studies: First, a study on the German energy market commissioned by the German
Parliament (2002), with scenarios for investment decisions summarized in Weber and Swider
(2004) [in the following GP/WS]. Second, Energiereport III, a study conducted by the
Institute of Energy Economics (EWI) in Cologne and Prognos (2000) for the the German
Ministry of Economics [in the following EWI/P].
The relevant annuity is determined as follows: Total investment cost ranges between
279 €/KW (GP/WS) and 300 €/KW (EWI/P). Annual xed cost of running a gas turbine
is already included in GP/WS, and is given by 8 €/KWa in EWI/P. This value is corrected
by the average availability of gas turbines, which, in Germany, is given by 94%.32 Based
on a nancial horizon of 20 years and an interest rate of 10 % this yields annuities of
34863 €/MWa (GP/WS) and 45998 €/MWa (EWI/P). Finally, the free allotment of CO2
allowances granted to new power plants results in a de facto reduction of the annuity by the
net value of the allocated allowances. Calculating their value on the basis of the average
market price in 2006 yields 6305.3 €/MWa. The range of relevant annuities which we use
in our simulation is consequently given by [28558, 39692] €/MWa.
Figure 2 shows | for dierent numbers of rms | total investment in all four scenarios
we discuss. In the gure, the big symbols represent the average value while the two smaller
symbols of the same type determine the 90 % condence interval of our simulation. Ob-
viously, predicted capacities are not very sensitive to changes in the parameters. The rst
best investment does not change in the number of rms since we assume that each rm's
marginal generating unit is a gas turbine, independent of the number of rms and the level
of demand. Strategic capacity choice (scenario C) is at only 50 % of the optimal level for
the monopoly case, while it is at 80 % of the optimal level for four rms. The graph illus-
trates that the presence of market power not only aects spot prices, but also has a strong
eect on capacity choices. Total capacity installed in Germany in 2006 was approximately
68 GW in a market with four large rms.33 The relatively high level of actual capacity as
compared to our results reects the fact in the pre-liberalization period (i.e. before 1998)
generators where subject to a rate of return regulation that imposed excessive investment
incentives.
From the predicted capacity levels we now compute the price distribution for those
hours where capacity is predicted to be binding in the Cournot game. Since we want to
32Compare VGB Powertech (2006).
33The German market consists essentially of four large players. Two of them (RWE and E.on) have a
market share of 26 % each, while the two smaller ones (ENBW and Vattenfall) together cover 30 % of the



















Figure 2: Investment Levels in all Four Cases.
compare predicted prices to the observed price distribution, we choose (in accordance with
the German market structure) a scenario of four rms. We, moreover, choose the mean
values of the parameter intervals which we used in our simulations, i.e. b = 0:0055, and k =
35430=MWa.34 For our data set strategic rms are capacity constrained in approximately
1107 hours (12.6 % of the year).35 Figure 3 provides the observed price distribution (grey
line), as well as the predicted price distributions during the hours with a binding capacity
constraint, separately for scenarios FB, SB, C, and MC (black lines). In order to make the
dierences more visible, in the gure we focus on prices in the interval [0;500] and provide
information on the highest price realizations in the legend. Obviously, for the parameter
conguration we chose, observed prices are above predicted prices in the rst best scenario
34We could also determine the price distribution for ranges of parameters. Since capacities have turned
out not to be very sensitive to changes in the parameters, however, we chose to use mean values to make
our illustration more readable.
35Our predicted values match the empirical observations. Due to Umweltbundesamt (2004), gas turbines
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Figure 3: Price Distribution in the Hours where Capacity is Binding, Cases C, MC, SB,
FB, and Observed Prices.
but well below predicted prices in the Cournot market game. All depicted prices reect the
willingness to pay for an additional unit of capacity that cannot be produced in the short
run. Notice that the relatively low level of observed prices (as compared to the Cournot
scenario) may well be due to the fact that currently rms have more capacity installed than
they would have chosen in a liberalized regime.36 Our theoretical analysis implies that the
current prices do not yield sucient investment incentives to sustain the current capacity
level. Strategic investment would strongly aect the price distribution, as comparison of
the curves for the cases FB and C illustrates. Obviously, there is a strong potential for
market power not only in the short run, but also at the investment stage.
Finally, gure 4 illustrates the welfare eect that results from regulation of spot market
prices down to the competitive level. All welfare dierences are calculated in relation to the









































































Figure 4: Welfare Dierences to the Cournot Case (C) for Cases MC, SB, and FB.
Cournot market game. Again, we ran simulations using the relevant parameter ranges. Big
symbols represent average welfare dierences while small symbols are the 90 % condence
intervals. As we have already seen from the theoretical analysis and from gure 2, imposing
marginal cost prices at the spot market considerably decreases equilibrium investment. The
gure shows that if the number of rms in the market is low, enforcement of marginal cost
pricing at the spot market moreover decreases total welfare. Only if the number of rms is
four or higher, total welfare is increasing. Thus, our analysis demonstrates that intervention
only at the spot market does not necessarily have the desired eect if rms choose their
capacities strategically.
The gure moreover illustrates the welfare eect of intervention only at the investment
stage (scenario SB) and of implementation of the First Best solution. As it becomes clear
from the graph, performance of the Cournot market game is getting very close to the rst
best solution as the number of competitors becomes large. We also observe that, while
the eect of increasing capacities given that rms have market power at the spot market
20is moderate for all market structures, intervention at the spot market may have relatively
large negative eects on welfare if the number of rms is low.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided a general model of strategic investment decisions under un-
certainty prior to imperfectly competitive markets. We have shown existence and unique-
ness of equilibrium and provided an intuitive characterization of equilibrium investment.
We found that under imperfect competition increasing capacity is desirable from a social
welfare point of view. We also demonstrated that intervention only at the spot market leads
to strategic uncertainty at the investment stage and, moreover, decreases total investment.
Thus, in markets with considerable demand uctuations, (partial) intervention only at the
spot market stage has to be carefully reconsidered.
We have also tted our theoretical model to the data of the German electricity mar-
ket. We derive predicted capacity levels for various degrees of market concentration, and
illustrated welfare eects of regulatory interventions. In a market of four rms (which
corresponds to the current situation in Germany) predicted strategic capacity choices are
at 80 % of the First Best level, while installed capacity is even at approximately 96 %
of our First Best prediction. This is presumably due to high investment incentives in the
pre{liberalization period. In accordance with the relatively high current capacity level, the
observed distribution of prices in 2006 is close to the predicted First Best price distribution
for those scenarios where our model predicts that capacity is binding. An immediate impli-
cation of our theoretical analysis is, however, that the observed prices are not high enough
to sustain the current level of capacity if investment is strategic. Moreover, for a market
structure of four rms we nd a slightly positive welfare eect of market monitoring at the
production stage. For highly concentrated markets (i.e. monopoly or duopoly), strategic
capacity choices are far below the First Best level. We nd that in concentrated markets,
market monitoring at the spot market would decrease the investment incentives drastically
and would therefore have a large and negative welfare eect.
While the model provides a solid intuition for how investment incentives and welfare
are aected by regulatory intervention, specic market designs under consideration still
have to be analyzed carefully in order to obtain reliable policy conclusions. To this aim,
our model provides a tractable framework for the analysis of dierent scenarios at the
market stage. The framework captures the stylized fact that at the time when they make
21their investment decisions rms face considerable uncertainty both about future demand
and production cost, and probably also with respect to future regulatory regimes. Let us
outline several directions of research that can directly benet from the analysis done in this
paper.
The most obvious application of the model is to modify the game played at the second
stage in order to analyze how dierent market designs or regulatory interventions aect
investment incentives and welfare. In this line, Grimm and Zoettl (2006) analyze how in-
vestment incentives are aected by the introduction of forward markets prior to spot trad-
ing. Another closely related article, Grimm and Zoettl (2007), uses the present framework
to analyze the eect of price caps on production and welfare under demand uncertainty.
Whereas the results of Grimm and Zoettl (2006) conrm the intuition that making the spot
market outcome more competitive (through the introduction of forward markets) decreases
investments, Grimm and Zoettl (2007) nd that price caps at stage two may actually in-
crease investment incentives. The reason is that price caps eliminate an important feature
of the present model, i. e. prices cannot rise unboundedly in case of insucient capacity,
which makes strategic withholding of capacity less protable.
A second line of research for which the current model serves as a starting point is
the analysis of choice between dierent production technologies. On the one hand, such a
model would allow to analyze the eect of policy tools like emission allowances in electricity
markets on the technology mix chosen by strategic rms. On the other hand it could serve
as the theoretical benchmark that allows to estimate the eect of market power at the
investment stage also for inframarginal technologies.
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A Analysis of the Production Stage
The appendix contains all proofs of the paper. In the rst part, we analyze the second stage
of the game, which we need in order to proof theorems 1 (appendix B) and 2 (appendix C).
In the rst step we characterize capacity constrained production choices at stage two
for each  given investment choices x. Note that we have to consider also asymmetric
investments. In order to simplify the exposition we will order the rms according to their
investment levels, i. e. x1  x2    xn, throughout the paper. At stage two either
rms engage in Cournot competition or a social planer implements the optimal production
schedule given investment choices. In this appendix we analyze both scenarios.
25A.1 Cournot Competition at the Production Stage
An equilibrium of the capacity constrained Cournot game at stage two in scenario  given
x, qC(x;), satises simultaneously for all rms
q
C







s.t. 0  q  xi: (3)
Note that at very low values of  all rms are necessarily unconstrained. By assumption 1
the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium [which we denote by ~ qC0()] is unique and symmetric
for each  2 [ 1;1].37 From (3) it follows that ~ qC0








i = Cq(~ q
C0
i ;):
Now as  increases, at some critical value that we denote by C1(x), rm 1 (the one
with the lowest capacity) becomes constrained. The critical demand scenario is implicitly
determined by x1 = qC0
1 (C1). If it holds that x1 < x2, then at C1(x) only rm one
becomes constrained. Then, in equilibrium, rm 1 produces at its capacity bound whereas
the remaining rms produce their equilibrium output of the Cournot game among n   1
rms given the residual demand P(Q   x1;) [denoted by ~ qC1
i (x;)], which solves the rst
order condition
P(x1 + (n   1)~ q
C1




i = Cq(~ q
C1
i ;):
The capacity constrained Cournot equilibrium in the case where one rm is constrained is
a vector qC1(x;), where qC1
i (x;) = minfxi; ~ qC1(x;)g.
As  increases further, we pass through n+1 cases, from case C0 (no rm is constrained)
to case Cn (all n rms are constrained). Note that two critical values Cm(x) and Cm+1(x)
coincide whenever xm = xm+1, and that it holds that Cm(x) < Cm+1(x) (by assumption
2) whenever xm < xm+1.
Now we are prepared to characterize the capacity constrained Cournot equilibrium in
case Cm where m rms are constrained. In this case, the m rms with the lowest capacities
































37See, for example Selten (1970), or Vives (2001), pp. 97/98.




i (x;) = minfxi; ~ q
Cm
i (x;)g; (5)






























if i > m:
(7)
Note that it holds that
dCm
i
dxi > 0 only if i  m, and
dCm
i
dxi = 0 otherwise, since a rm's
capacity expansion only aects production at stage two in case the rm was constrained.
Obviously, in this case the derivative must be positive.
We can nally pin down maximal social welfare generated in demand scenario  2















(we need this in order to prove Part (SB) of theorem 2). Note that W FBm only depends
on xi if rm i is constrained in scenario m, that is if i  m.
Property 1 (Monotonicity of Cm)
dCm(x)
dxi is strictly positive if i  m (i.e. if rm i
produces at its capacity bound), and zero otherwise.
Proof Cm(x) is the demand realization from which on rm m cannot play its uncon-
strained output any more. At Cm(x) it holds that qC
i (Cm(x)) = ~ qCm
i (Cm(x)) = xm for
all i  m and qC



















Dierentiation with respect to xi, i < m, yields
Pq () + P ()
dCm (x)
dxi













Pq () + Pqq ()xm
P () + Pq ()xm   Cq ()
> 0
due to assumption 1, part (i) and assumption 2, part (ii) [note that the expression in
the denominator is the cross derivative which was assumed to be positive in part (ii) of
assumption 2].
Dierentiation with respect to xi, i = m, yields
(n   m + 2)Pq () + P ()
dCm (x)
dxi
+(n   m + 1)Pqq ()xm + Px ()xm
dCm (x)
dxi










(n   m + 2)Pq () + (n   m + 1)Pqq ()xm   Cxx ()
P () + Pq ()xm   Cq ()
> 0;
also due to assumption 1, parts (i) and assumption 2, part (ii). Finally, dierentiation













dxi = 0 for i > m. 
A.2 Welfare maximization at the Production stage
In the following we specify, for a given vector of capacities x, the welfare optimal production
schedule for any possible demand scenario (that is, for any possible value of ).38
Note that necessarily all rms are unconstrained for very low values of . It is straight-
forward to show that in the welfare optimum, all unconstrained rms produce the same
(due to convex cost). Thus, the socially optimal total quantity of each rm if all rms are
unconstrained is given by qFB0
i () = fqi 2 R : P(nqi;) = Cq (qi;)g.
Now, as  increases, at some critical value, that we denote by FB1(x), rm 1 (the lowest
capacity rm) becomes constrained. The critical demand scenario FB1(x) is implicitly de-
ned by x1 = qFB0
1 (FB1). If it holds that x1 < x2, then at FB1(x) only rm 1 becomes con-
strained and the socially optimal production plan implies that rm 1 produces at its capacity
bound whereas the remaining rms produce the unconstrained optimal quantity given the
38With convex cost a characterization of the welfare optimum could probably be given with less mathe-
matical burden. However, we will need the characterization developed here also in section ??.
28residual demand P(Q x1;), i. e. ~ qFB1
i (x;) = fqi 2 R : P((n   1)qi + x1;) = Cq (qi;)g.
The optimal production plan in scenario FB1 is a vector qFB1(x;), where each element is
given by qFB1
i (x;) = minfxi; ~ qFB1
i (x;)g.
As  increases further and more rms become constrained, we pass through n+1 cases,
from case FB0 (no rm is constrained) to case FBn (all n rms are constrained). Note
that two critical values FBm(x) and FBm+1(x) coincide whenever xm = xm+1, and that it
holds that FBm(x) < FBm+1(x) (by assumption 2) whenever xm < xm+1.
Now we are prepared to characterize the socially optimal production plan and social wel-
fare generated in case FBm, where m rms are constrained. In this case, the m rms with
the lowest capacities produce at their capacity bound, whereas the n m unconstrained rms





















i (x;) = minfxi; ~ q
FBm
i (x;)g i = 1;:::;n: (10)






























if i > m:
(12)
We can nally pin down maximal social welfare generated in demand scenario  2















(we need this in the proof of theorem 2). Note that W FBm only depends on xi if rm i is
constrained in scenario m, that is if i  m.
29B Proof of Theorem 1
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1, Case (C)
Now we are prepared to analyze capacity choices at the investment stage. The results
obtained for the production stage enable us to derive a rm i's prot from investing xi,
given that the other rms invest x i and quantity choices at stage two are given by qCm(x;)
for  2 [Cm(x);Cm+1(x)]. Recall that when choosing capacities the rms face demand
uncertainty. Thus, a rm's prot from given levels of investments, x, is the integral over
equilibrium prots at each  given x on the domain [ 1;1], taking into account the
probability distribution over the demand scenarios. For each , rms anticipate equilibrium
play at the production stage, which gives rise to one of the n+1 types of equilibria, EQC0,
..., EQCm, ..., EQCn. Note that any x > 0 gives rise to the unconstrained equilibrium if 
is suciently low. As  increases, more and more rms become constrained. Thus, a tuple
of investment levels that initially gave rise to an EQC0, then leads to an equilibrium where
rst one (then two, three, ..., and nally n) rms are constrained. In order to simplify the









i (x;)dF()   K(xi): (14)
Note that at each critical value Cm, m = 1;:::;n it holds that Cm 1(x;Cm) =













dF ()   Kx (xi) (15)
We prove part (i) of the lemma in two steps. In part I we show existence and in part II
uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Part I: Existence of Equilibrium In the following we show that a symmetric equilib-
rium of the two stage Cournot market game exists, and that equilibrium choices xC
i = 1
nXC,
i = 1;:::;n, are implicitly dened by equation (2). For this purpose it is sucient to show
39Note that it is never optimal for a rm to be unconstrained at 1 and thus, we always obtain Cn  1.
40Note that continuity of i implies that due to Leibnitz' rule the derivatives of the integration limits
cancel out. Moreover, Cm
i only changes in xi if rm i is constrained in scenario FBm, i. e. i  m. Thus,
the sum does not include the cases where rm i is unconstrained, i. e. m < i.
30quasiconcavity of rm i's prot given the other rms invest xC
 i, i(xi;xC
 i), which we do in
the following.
Note that i(xi;xC
 i) is dened piecewisely. For xi < xC
i , we have to examine to prot
of rm 1 (by convention the lowest capacity rm) given that x2 = x3 =  = xn. Since

















i (x;)dF()   K(x1)
For xi > xC
i , the prot of rm i is the prot of the highest capacity rm (rm n according


















n (x;)dF()   K(x1)
(i) The shape of i(xi;xC
 i) for xi > xC




















<0 by A1 part (iv)
f()d < 0: (18)
Note that the rst term cancels out and the second term is negative by concavity of the
spot market prot function (implied by assumption 1). We nd that for xi  xC
i , i(xi;xC
 i)
is concave, which implies that upwards deviations are not protable.
(ii) The shape of i(xi;xC
 i) for xi < xC
i : This region is more dicult to analyze since
the prot function 1(x1;xC
 1) is not concave. We can, however, show quasiconcavity of
1(x1;xC
 1). For this purpose we need property 2 in order to complete the proof of existence
(part I). We can show quasiconcavity of 1(x1;xC















41It is obvious that there is no incentive for any rm to deviate such that it is unconstrained at 1. Thus,
we only consider the case that all rms are constrained at 1.


































































































dxi =0 [recall that C1(xC)=Cn(xC)]
 0:
To summarize, in part I (i) and (ii) we have shown that i(xi;xC
i ) is quasiconcave. We
conclude that the rst order condition given in theorem 1 indeed characterizes equilibrium
investment in the Cournot market game.
Property 2 [Properties of Marginal Profits at Stage Two] Suppose all rms
but rm 1 have invested symmetric capacities summarized in the vector x0
 1. Firm 1 has

















dx1  0 for x0
1 < x00
1, Cn    1.
Proof (i) The rst part holds due to the fact in case rm 1 is constrained, i. e. (  C1),
rm 1 would like to produce more than x1 for all demand realizations   C1, which,
however, is not possible due to the capacity constraint.
(ii) The rst inequality follows from concavity of the prot functions in the spot markets,
which is implied by assumption 1. Thus, the rst order condition at each spot-market is
decreasing in x1 until ~ qC0
i , which immediately yields the rst inequality of part (ii). The
second inequality is due to the fact that in case all rms are constrained, i. e. ( 2 [Cn;1]),
rm 1 would like to produce more for all demand realizations  (which is not possible because
it is constrained). 
32Part II: Uniqueness In this part we show that (i) xC is the unique symmetric equilib-
rium and (ii) that there are no asymmetric equilibria.






























which is negative due to assumption 1. Thus, since
di(xC)
dxi = 0 and moreover i(x) is
concave along the symmetry line, no other symmetric equilibrium can exist.
(ii) There cannot exist an asymmetric equilibrium. Any candidate for an asymmetric
equilibrium ^ x can be ordered such that ^ x1  ^ x2    ^ xn, where at least one inequality
has to hold strictly. This implies ^ x1 < ^ xn. The prot of rm n can be obtained by setting










It is easy to show that rm n's prot function is concave by examination of the second
derivative [see equation (18)]. Thus, any asymmetric equilibrium ^ x, if it exists, must satisfy
dn(^ x)
dxn = 0. We now show that whenever it holds that
dn(^ x)
dxn = 0, rm 1's prot is increasing
in x1 at ^ x (which implies that no asymmetric equilibria exist).

















Note that all the integrals in
d1
dx1 are positive since rm 1 is constrained at all demand










where the RHS are simply the last two terms of
d1
dx1. Note furthermore that ^ x1 < ^ xn also
implies that Kx(^ x1) < Kx(^ xn) (due to assumption 3) and
d1(^ x)
dx1
= P(^ x;) + Pq(^ x;)^ x1   Cq(^ x1;) < P(^ x;) + Pq(^ x;)^ xn   Cq(^ xn;) =
dn(^ x)
dxn
42Dierentiation works as in (18).















f()d   Kx(xn) = 0:
The last equality is due to the fact that this part is equivalent to the rst order condition of
rm n, which is satised at ^ x by construction. To summarize, we have shown that
d1
dx1 > 0,
which implies that there exist no asymmetric equilibria, since at any equilibrium candidate,
rm 1 has an incentive to increase its capacity.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1, Case (MC)
If the competitive outcome is implemented at stage two, rm i's stage two{prot in scenario
 is given by (12). The stage one expected prot of rm i is obtained by integrating over









i (x;)dF()   K (xi): (19)













dF ()   Kx (xi): (20)
Now note that
di
dxi > 0 at X = 0 (since investment is gainful), that
di
dxi < 0 for some nite
value of X, and that
di
dxi is continuous. Thus, a corner solution is not possible, and we have
at least one point where (2) is satised and
di
dxi is decreasing. Note, however, that this does
not assure existence. In fact, in the scenario considered here a rm's stage one prot is not
even quasiconcave, and it is not possible to reformulate the game as a supermodular game.
Now assume constant marginal cost. Note that in the case of constant marginal costs
it is, independently of the capacity choices rms made at stage one, always true that
either all rms are constrained at p = Cq(;), or none of them. Thus, it holds that
FB1(x) =  = FBn(x).
In order to prove part (MC) of theorem 1, we apply theorem 2.1 of Amir and Lamb-
son (2000), p. 239. They show that the standard Cournot oligopoly game has at least one
symmetric equilibrium and no asymmetric equilibria whenever demand P() is continuously
dierentiable and decreasing, cost C() is twice continuously dierentiable and nondecreas-
ing and, moreover, the cross partial derivative
d(X;q)
dX idX > 0, where X denotes total capacity
43We dene FB0 =  1 and FBn+1 = 1.
34and X i capacity chosen by the rms other than i. In order to see that the results of Amir
and Lambson apply to our setup, note that our game is equivalent to a game where rms
choose output given the expected demand and cost function. Note that if the rst best













P (X;)dF (); (21)













C (xi;)dF () + K (xi); (22)
Note that EP(X) is strictly decreasing in X and EC(xi) is strictly increasing in xi, but
they do not satisfy assumption 1, part (i), which is why existence and uniqueness are not
implied by standard (textbook) analysis.44 However, Amir and Lambson's assumptions45



















is positive. This guarantees that we have at least one symmetric equilibrium and no
asymmetric equilibria in case of constant marginal cost.
C Sketch of the Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of theorem 2, when welfare maximizing capacities are chosen is quite similar to
the proof of theorem 1. We therefore give only a brief sketch, and refer to a working paper
version of the paper (Grimm and Zoettl (2006)) for an extensive version of the proof.
44In fact, the expected prot function is not even quasiconcave, as it is easily seen by inspecting its second
derivative. Those observations point to an error in the article of Reynolds and Wilson (2000). They make
almost the same assumptions on demand as we do, but are more restrictive regarding cost (i. e. Cq(xi) = 0
and K(xi) = kxi). They state (p.126 of the article) that E[xiP(xi + x i;)   kxi] (in our notation) is
strictly concave and dierentiable in xi and therefore has a unique solution. Since E[xiP(xi+x i;) kxi]
is exactly the prot given by equation (19) for Cq(xi) = 0 and K(xi) = kxi, our analysis shows that this
is not true.
45The assumptions are: P() is continuously dierentiable with Pq() < 0, C() is twice continuously
dierentiable and nondecreasing, and Pq(X)   Cqq(xi) < 0.
35In order to prove part (FB), we consider for each realization of  the welfare maximum
at the spot market for xed capacity choices. Integration over all realizations of uncertainty












Note that at each critical value FBm, m = 1;:::;n, it holds that W FBm 1(x;FBm) =











dF ()   Kx (xi) = 0: (24)
After verication of the second order conditions we can conclude that the above rst order
condition (24) yields a unique and symmetric rst best solution as given stated by theorem
2, part (FB).
In order to proof part (SB), we need to determine welfare generated at the spot market at
each realization of  for xed capacity choices given Cournot competition. Expected welfare
is then again determined by integrating over all realizations of uncertainty and evaluation
of rst and second order conditions yields a unique and symmetric solution stated in the
theorem.
D Proof of Theorem 3
Part (i) Consider the rst order conditions that implicitly dene total capacities in the
four scenarios considered, as given in theorems 1 and 2. Recall that (i) Pq(X;) < 0, and
note that (ii) Cn(x) > FBn(x) for all x. Furthermore, (iii) at (below, above) the demand
realization Cn(xC) we have that Pq(XC;)XC
n + P(XC;)   Cq( 1
nXC;) = 0 (< 0; > 0).



















































36Note that according to theorems 1 and 2, the total capacities are determined as the values




, Z 2 fFB; SB; C; MCg. Recall that
in all cases we get interior solutions and note that the above terms (except for the one
that determines XMC) are decreasing in X, while Kx is increasing in X. This immediately
implies XFB  XSB > XC.
In order to see why the ranking stated in the theorem also holds for case MC, note
that the above term in scenario C is strictly decreasing in X, whereas in scenario MC it
satises LHS(0) > Kx(0) (since production is gainful) and LHS(X) < Kx(X) for X high
enough. Since Kx(X) is increasing in X, this immediately implies that for any equilibrium
investment XMC it holds that XC  XMC.




E Proof of Theorem 4
Let x0 be a vector of equal capacities summing up to X0. We have FBn(x0)  Cn(x0) for
all x0 and both, FBn(x0) and Cn(x0) are increasing in X0.
(i) If XC  QC(), then Cn(xC)  , since installed capacities are lower than the un-
constrained Cournot-output at the lowest realization of uncertainty with positive weight
denoted by . This implies that FBn(xMC)  Cn(xC)  , since XMC  XC.
Then the rst order conditions for the cases (C) and (MC) in theorem 1 collapse since
f() = 0 for all  2 [FBn(xMC);] and thus, the lower limit of integration is given by .
This proves ")". In order to prove "(", note that XC > QC() implies   FBn(xMC) <
Cn(xC).Then the the lower limit of integration in rst order conditions for the cases (C)
and (MC) does not coincide which implies XMC < XC if f() > 0 for all  2 [;].
(ii) The proof works analogously to part (i).
37